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ABSTRACT 
Policy analysis of the charitable contribution deduction has 
focused on two aspects. First, the deduction gives a larger subsidy to 
high-income individuals, Second, the activities subsidized are often 
public goods or create positive externalities. The focus on those two 
traits has led some economists to test the deduction using traditional 
cost allocation criteria for public goods such as Lindahl equilibrium. 
A leading paper finds that a tax credit better approximates the Lindahl 
criteria than a deduction. This paper shows that the opposite may be 
true if the taxes raised to fund the revenue loss from the deduction 
are even slightly progressive. 
This finding suggests that the deduction may be a political 
bargain outcome that benefits a wide range of groups. The second 
part of this paper discusses qualitatively how a political bargain theory 
can explain the role chosen for the deduction in conjunction with other 
methods of subsidy and direct government provision. 
I. Introduction 
Tax policy analysis of the charitable contribution deduction 
traditionally has focused on two traits of the deduction as a way to 
fund charitable activities . First , and most prominent , is the fact 
that use of a deduction (rather than devices like a refundable tax 
credit or a government matching grant ) favors high-income individuals 
by granting them a larger subsidy per dollar contributed. 1 For a
high-income taxpayer in the .so bracket, the government in effect pays 
half the taxpayer ' s  charitable contributions while for a low-income 
taxpayer in the . 1 0  bracket the government in effect pays only one­
tenth . This disparity is accentuated if the charitable contribution 
deduction is an itemized deduction. 2 Taxpayers whose itemized
deductions are less than the zero bracket amount will not itemize and 
thus will get no tax benefit from making charitable contributions . A 
large proportion of low-income taxpayers have been non-itemizers while 
most high-income taxpayers itemize,3
The second trait is that charitable contributions 
subs tantially benefit parties other than the contributors. This trait 
leads to arguments that the deduction may be defensible although it 
apparently favors high-income individuals.  Suppose, for example , that 
the contributions go to an organization that distributes them to the 
poor . To remove the deduction in that case may be seen as a "tax" on 
the poor . 
This type of argument is too limited to justify the deduction. 
Many of the charitable services that are made possible by donations 
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primarily or at least partially benefit high-income taxpayers .  For 
example,  higher education, symphonies and art museums are 
organizations that are supported at least in part by deductible 
donations, and the services provided by these organizations 
substantially benefit high-income individuals .  
An additional argument , however , applies t o  many such 
services.  These services tend to have "public good" aspects that lead 
them to be undersupplied absent some form of government intervention. 
In the pure case of a public good, the good can be consumed by one 
person without diminishing consumption by another , and it is hard to 
fund production of the good by charging each person for the benefits 
that he or she receives from it.  
Much of the recent work on the charitable contribution 
deduction has focused on whether the benefits created by the deduction 
in the form of helping the poor or producing public goods make the 
deduction a desirable policy despite the fact that it provides a 
larger subsidy to high-income individuals than to low-income 
individuals .  4 Perhaps the most comprehensive effort in this direction
is an article by Professor John Simon. Professor Simon points out 
that charitable organizations produce public goods and notes that the 
poor consume some of these goods . 5 To determine whether the deduction
is good policy he proposes a four-branch fairness test, 6 Three of the
branches of his test weigh the added public goods output and added aid 
to the poor against the favoritism to high-income individuals that 
inheres in a deduction. 
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The last branch of Professor Simon ' s  test asks whether the 
groups apparently disadvantaged by the charitable contribution 
deduction, ! .�.,  all but a few people in the upper income brackets, 
could overturn the deduction if they wished .  Professor Simon notes 
that the vast majority of people get little or no tax benefit from the 
deduction but that in a 1 976 Gallup poll 7S"fo of those questioned 
favored the deduction. 7 He speculates that this may be due either to 
ignorance of the fact that the deduction gives the rich a larger 
subsidy or to an acceptance of inequality . 8 A more positive view 
would be that there is awareness of the inequity of the subsidy but 
that low-income and middle-income voters also are well aware of the 
additional public goods output induced by the deduction. Those voters 
may feel that the benefits to them from the activities generated by 
the deduction exceed any costs paid by them in the form of additional 
taxes to make up for the revenue loss caused by the deduction. 
Alternatively, even if the deduction primarily subsidizes public goods 
desired by high-income classes , it may be that any revenue loss from 
the deduction is made up by additional taxes paid by those classes . 
This possibility that the charitable contribution deduction is 
a political bargain that is Pareto improving (! .�·· benefits some 
members of society and hurts no one ) has important implications for 
the entire current debate about the deduction. If the deduction plays 
that sort of role,  then the concern about favoritism toward high­
income individuals is blunted if not eliminated . Low-income and 
middle-income individuals would be no worse off as a result of the 
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deduction and might experience substantial benefits . 
In Part II I explore the possibility that the deduction is 
part of a political bargain that meets the norm of not making low­
income and middle-income individuals any worse-off.  Section II-A 
gives a qualitative example of how that possibility might come about. 
Two economists, Harold Hochman and James Rodgers, argue that a 
political bargain meeting a closely related norm would result in a tax 
credit rather than a deduction. In section II-B and the Appendix I 
take issue with that viewpoint and conclude that it is plausible (but 
not certain)  that a deduction would be the result under their norm. 
In light of that conclusion it is important to ask whether it 
is likely that the political process produces legislative packages 
that meet the norm postulated in this article or Hochman and Rodgers ' 
related norm . In particular, if groups that ostensibly are harmed by 
the deduction can protect themselves via the political process, then 
survival of the deduction suggests that the apparent favoritism toward 
high-income individuals inherent in a deduction should not be a 
concern.  Conversely, if the political process systematically 
disfavors those who ostensibly are disfavored by the deduction, then 
the "inequity" inherent in the deduction cannot be fixed unless the 
political process is reformed or replaced by some other method of 
governance, 
After developing those arguments further, section II-C goes on 
to examine evidence about how the political process does function. 
Unfortunately, no clear answer emerges . One cannot tell for sure 
whether or not the charitable contribution deduction is acceptable 
under the posited norms .  Part II a s  a whole,  however, shows that 
viewing the charitable contribution deduction as a political bargain 
may blunt or eliminate the conventional concern about favoritism of 
high-income individuals.  That favoritism is  probably the major tax 
policy issue concerning the deduction. 
s 
Taking a political bargain view of the deduction also affects 
many other issues surrounding the deduction. Part III starts from the 
presumption that the deduction is a political bargain in the interest 
of many different groups and studies the effects of that presumption 
on two major issues . I first consider whether there is a serious 
misallocation of resources arising from donors who give for reasons 
unconnected with the substantive value of the output of donee 
organizations . Section III-B argues that this "nonsubstantive giving" 
may not be as serious a problem as commonly imagined. 
The second major issue concerns which government mechanisms 
( such as direct production, tax benefits , or consumer subsidies) 
should be used to satisfy public goods demand. Part III addresses 
this issue by focusing on a variety of motivations for supporting 
"17 0 ( c )  activities . "  ( Contributions to an organization will be 
deductible as charitable contributions only if the organization is 
among the organizations specified in section 17 0 ( c )  of the Internal 
Revenue Code . It is convenient to refer to these organizations as 
"170 ( c )  organizations" or as part of the "17 0 ( c )  sector" and to refer 
to the activities of the organizations as "17 0 ( c )  activities") .  Some 
of the suggested connections between motivations and "policy mix" are 
speculative. But one can conclude that viewing the deduction as a 
political bargain has important implications for the optimal policy 
mix. 
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II. The Crucial Role of the Political Process 
A. A Political Equilibrium Approach 
1 .  A Normative Structure 
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This subsection uses a simple norm to express the concern 
about favoritism toward high-income individuals ,  I f  i t  can be 
demonstrated that the norm is satisfied by the charitable contribution 
deduction, then the concern about favoritism in the literature is 
unwarranted. 
Before stating the norm, it is important to make clear the set 
of legislative policies that must be evaluated under the norm . 
Viewing the charitable contribution deduction as the result of a 
political bargain means that other legislation may be passed because 
of the deduction. This other legislation might include increases in 
tax rates for those who benefit directly from the deduction or 
expenditures in favor of those who are not so benefited . The 
deduction cannot be evaluated in isolation. Evaluation must include 
the entire package of adjustments made to accompany the deduction. 
This package is referred to as "legislation accompanying the 
to fund the revenue loss from the deduction than they receive in 
benefits from the additional charitable activity induced by the 
deduction. 
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At first glance this norm ignores the fair distribution of the 
surplus from public goods production. That surplus is the value to 
individuals of the goods in excess of the social cost of production. 
Certain groups may receive disproportionately large amounts of the 
surplus , and an additional tax adjustment might be used to transfer 
some of the surplus experienced by those groups to others . 
I do not specify how the surplus from public goods production 
ought to be distributed . Instead, distributional considerations enter 
at the level of preferences. In other words, preferences for or 
against provision of any public good include preferences concerning 
the distributional impacts of such provision. When provision of a 
public good combined with an allocation of the cost of producing it is 
unobjectionable under the norm, then low-income and middle-income 
people experience no net loss where "loss" includes any offense to 
their distributional sensibilities . 9
2 .  The Charitable Contribution Deduction.!!.!! g Political
deduction. " Bargain 
The norm is the following : the charitable contribution 
deduction, combined with any tax adjustment or other legislation 
accompanying it ,  is objectionable if and only if it results in net 
losses for low-income or middle-income people .  This norm would be 
violated,  for example, if those income classes must pay more in taxes 
Is it possible that the charitable contribution deduction and 
accompanying legislation reflect a political bargain that is in accord 
with the norm? This subsection shows in a qualitative way that the 
answer may be yes . In making this argument , I generally assume that 
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all parties to any bargain have reasonably complete information about 
the effects of the deduction .  Those effects include the amount of 
additional contributions that the deduction induces and the breakdown 
of those additional contributions between different 170 ( c )  activities. 
Given this information assumption, the charitable deduction must serve 
more than a redistributional purpose . Since the value of subsidized 
goods to a recipient may be less than their market value, cash 
tranfers would be a more efficient redistributional device . This 
argument does not follow if information is incomplete. Suppose, as is 
the case, that there is uncertainty about the extra contributions 
stimUlated per dollar of tax revenues lost from the deduction. 1 0  
High-income taxpayers may know that they d o  not expand their giving 
much in response to the deduction, while low-income taxpayers believe 
the opposite. In this case, if taxes paid by low-income individuals 
partially fund the deduction, then the deduction serves primarily as 
an income transfer to high-income taxpayers .  The information 
asymmetry may allow high-income taxpayers to fool low-income taxpayers 
into supporting the income transfer . Although there is a great deal 
of public information about the incentive effects of the charitable 
contribution deduction and about the nature of the additional 170( c )  
activities that tax-induced contributions fund, 11  i t  i s  still possible
that there is an exploitable information asymmetry. 12 Thus, 
incomplete information may lead the political process to function in 
derogation of the norm set out above . 
Although the charitable contribution deduction is not a good 
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device for pure redistribution when there is complete information, the 
deduction may be a good way to encourage provision of public goods by 
the 170(c )  sector . Suppose, for example, that a large number of high­
income individuals are interested in increasing the amount of cancer 
research . Middle-income and low-income individuals would benefit from 
such an increase and thus might go along with a subsidy to induce 
high-income people to increase their contributions. Although such 
groups would block a direct redistribution of income to the high­
income group, they might favor a subsidy that on the surface of things 
seems to benefit high-income people disproportionately. The public 
good aspect of cancer research is  critical to this political 
interaction: although one income group funds the research, other 
groups benefit from it.  
B .  Can A Deduction be an Appropriate Subsidy f.!ll:. Charitable
Contributions? 
1 .  A Basic Public Good Analysis : Hochman and Rodgers ' Model
Beginning with the presumption that the desire to encourage 
the production of public goods motivates a subsidy to 170( c )  
organizations, 13 i t  i s  important t o  ask whether a deduction i s  an
appropriate form of subsidy . The previous subsection raises the 
possibility that the deduction might be justified as a normatively 
acceptable political bargain.  In pursuing that kind of political 
analysis, individual motivations for contributing to an organization 
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or for supporting a subsidy for contributions to it are the elementary 
building blocks . 
It is analytically useful to consider a particularly simple 
motivation first: each donor contributes to the purchase of a good 
not because of any concern for others or for their consumption pattern 
and not because of a desire to give for the sake of giving itself but 
only because the donor values the good for his or her own "private 
consumption. " For example, each person may support cancer research 
because of the possibility that he or she will be afflicted with 
cancer in the future .  The implications o f  more complex motivations 
for the form of the subsidy and for whether the 170 ( c )  sector is the 
best provider of the services are considered in Section III. 
Hochman and Rodgers have developed a model, applicable to the 
"private consumption" case just defined, to determine the optimal 
structure of subsidies for 17 0( c )  organizations that satisfy public 
good demand. 14  For simplicity the model assumes there is only one
public good being produced by the 170 ( c )  sector . Call this one good 
"the 170( 0 )  good . " 
The normative structure of Hochman 6 Rodgers '  model is
congruent enough with the norm set out above that their result needs 
to be taken seriously. Consequently, a substantial effort is made in 
explaining their result ( in this subsection) and in showing (in the 
next subsection and the Appendix) that the result is flawed. 
The normative ideal in Hochman 6 Rodger ' s  model is to achieve
a "Lindahl equilibrium. "  Each individual in the economy pays for the 
170( c )  good in two ways. First, there is the net charitable 
contribution the individual makes . "Net" means that the part that 
effectively is paid by the government as a subsidy is subtracted. 
Second, the individual may have to pay additional taxes to help fund 
the subsidy. In the model the entire funding for the subsidy is in 
the form of additional taxes.  That is just a conceptual 
simplification that can stand for the impact on the individual of 
budget cutbacks, of an increase in national debt or of other nontax 
devices for funding the revenue loss from subsidizing contributions . 
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A Lindahl equilibrium obtains if an  optimal quantity of  170 ( c )  
good is produced, and each individual ' s  payment ( in the form o f  net 
charitable contribution and taxes)  equals the individual ' s  marginal 
valuation of the final unit of the 17 0( 0 )  good produced multiplied by 
the amount provided .  Thus , when a Lindahl equilibrium obtains, i t  i s  
as i f  each individual purchases all he or she wants a t  a price set at 
the individual ' s  marginal valuation of the final unit purchased .  
Unlike a private goods market, however, this price may differ for 
different individuals, and all individuals "buy" the same quantity. 
The optimal quantity of public good will be such that the sum of 
everyone ' s  marginal valuations of the final unit equals the social 
cost of producing that unit, 
Hochman and Rodgers see two normatively desirable traits in a 
Lindahl equilibrium. The equilibrium results in an efficient ( !·.!!·• 
Pareto optimal ) quantity of public good and is "distributionally 
neutral111 5  in the sense that each person simply buys the quantity she
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or he wants at a price equal to the individual ' s  marginal valuation of 
the last unit purchased. However, even when this marginal condition 
holds it may be true that the surplus generated by public production 
is distributed very unequally, Thus, it may not be appropriate to 
call the equilibrium distributionally neutral . Furthermore, including 
preferences about the distribution of consumer surplus in marginal 
valuations creates technical problems that in some cases make Lindahl 
equilibrium an inappropriate equilibrium concept . 16 
It follows from this discussion about consumer surplus that 
there are at least two instances where a Lindahl equilibrium satisfies 
the norm set out above. First, the norm is satisfied when the 
marginal valuations used to compute an equilibrium incorporate 
distributional preferences about consumer surplus and there is no 
technical problem . Second, when such distributional preferences are 
excluded from marginal valuations, a Lindahl equilibrium will still 
satisfy the norm if low-income and middle-income individuals do not 
find the resulting distribution of consumer surplus objectionable. 17
In each case no low-income or middle-income individual is worse-off 
because of provision of a public good through a Lindahl equilibrium . 
These two instances are significant enough that Hochman � Rodgers ' 
model cannot be dismissed on the basis of the norm set out above. 
Hochman and Rodgers argue that a flat-rate tax credit is a 
stronger candidate than a deduction for establishing a Lindahl 
equilibrium. Their technical arguments are detailed in the Appendix, 
while the core intuition is presented here. Their model has two 
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individuals i n  i t :  individual A has a high income while individual B 
has a low income. For both individuals the "payment" side of the 
Lindahl equilibrium consists of net charitable contributions plus any 
tax payments that go toward funding the revenue loss caused by 
subsidizing the contributions . The net charitable contribution for 
each individual is the contribution the individual would make without 
any subsidy multiplied by two factors. The first factor captures the 
"price effect" of the deduction. Applying this first factor to the 
no-subsidy contribution yields the gross contribution in the world 
with subsidies.  The second factor is one minus the subsidy rate . 
This factor reduces the gross contribution to a net amount that the 
individual actually "pays" after subtracting the subsidy portion 
provided by the government . Finally, individual A ' s  no-subsidy 
contribution is larger by a particular "income elasticity" factor than 
B ' s  no-subsidy contribution, 
Hochman and Rodgers make a crucial assumption about the tax 
portion of each individual ' s  payment. They assume that this portion 
can be ignored because it will be small in any event, and much of it 
may be shifted to other taxpayers who are not contributors and who may 
18 have little or no demand for the public good . This means that for 
each individual the payment side consists only of that individual ' s  
net charitable contribution. 
If the rate of subsidy is the same for each individual, then 
more can be said about the relation between their net charitable 
contributions . Under the assumption that each person responds to the 
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subsidy with the same intensity, each person will increase his  or  her 
gross contributions by the same proportion. ( "Responding with the 
same intensity" means in economic terminology that the two individuals 
have the same "price elasticity" for charitable giving ) . Furthermore, 
the term converting gross contributions into net contributions will be 
the same for both individuals .  As a result, their net charitable 
contributions will differ only by the "income elasticity" term : 
individual A ' s  no-subsidy contribution is higher than individual B ' s  
by some proportion due to the fact that A has higher income. 
On the "benefits" side, Hochman and Rodgers show that the 
marginal valuations ( the value of the last unit of public good) of A 
and B are related by the same "income elasticity" term that relates 
their no-subsidy contribution levels . 1 9  Thus, individual A ' s  marginal
valuation is larger than individual B ' s  by the same proportion that 
individual A ' s  net contribution exceeds individual B ' s .  As a result, 
a subsidy with equal rates for each individual such as a tax credit 
enables both individuals to satisfy the Lindahl conditions 
simultaneously. Hochman and Rodgers conclude that under their 
assumption neglecting the tax terms "or virtually any other assumption 
that is at all realistic, a flat-rate tax credit is likely to provide 
a good approximation to the Lindahl requirements . "20
2. An Extension of the Basic Public Goods Analysis : An 
Alternative Model
The Appendix to this article develops a model similar to that 
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of Hochman 6 Rodgers : it has two income classes, and the central
normative requirement is achieving a Lindahl equilibrium . Rather than 
adopt Hochman 6 Rodgers ' assumption that the tax part of each
individual ' s  payment in Lindahl equilibrium can be ignored, the model 
considers a range of possible tax structures for funding the revenue 
loss caused by the charitable contribution deduction. All of these 
tax structures are "progressive" in the sense that larger increases in 
percentage rates are imposed on the high-income individuals than on 
the low-income individuals who contribute .  
The striking result that emerges from this model i s  that when 
the tax shares used to fund a subsidy for charitable contributions are 
even slightly progressive, very high subsidy rates for A and very low 
subsidy rates for B may be a Lindahl equilibrium. This type of 
discrepancy in subsidy rates resembles the discrepancy inherent in a 
deduction. 
Intuitively these results emerge because high subsidy rates 
lower the net contribution of the high-income individual . This 
offsets the progressive tax rate increase so that the high-income 
individual makes the correct total payment in a Lindahl equilibrium 
for the benefits he or she receives from the increase in the 170( 0 )  
good . 21
These results that favor a deduction over a flat-rate subsidy 
such as a tax credit depend on assumptions about whether the tax part 
of the payment in Lindahl equilibrium can be ignored and, if not, what 
the rate structure of that tax part is, Hochman 6 Rodgers ' main
17 
justification for their decision to ignore the tax part of each 
individual ' s  payment is that the tax cost of the subsidy may be 
diverted to non-contributors outside of their model . 22 In fact ,
Hochman and Rodgers view it as "reasonable to think of a small 
across-the-board differential in marginal tax rates • as the means 
through which the costs of the subsidy are offset.1123 If this is what
is going on, it is hard to believe in Hochman � Rodgers' conclusion 
quoted above that a flat subsidy would "provide a good approximation 
to the Lindahl requirements . "  Those who had no particular desire for 
the activities supported by the subsidy would be taxed to fund the 
subsidy but would not receive benefits that they consider worth the 
tax costs.  That certainly is not a Lindahl equilibrium where each 
person pays taxes and contributions according to his or her valuation 
of the activities that are generated thereby, 24
Moving away from a Lindahl equilibrium in this way does more 
than block the application of a particular kind of economic analysis .  
I f  a substantial proportion o f  voters were taxed more than the 
benefits they receive on account of a subsidy for charitable 
contributions , the political viability of the subsidy would be 
impaired,  A more complex view of the political process, however, 
suggests that the tax revenue cost of a subsidy may be shifted onto 
those who benefit from the additional 170( c )  output it induces .  
Logrolling might serve such a function. Those who do not favor a 
subsidy for contributions may gain other favorable government 
expenditures or tax reductions in exchange for supporting the subsidy . 
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The tax revenue cost of those government expenditures o r  tax 
reductions will fall partly on those who want the subsidy for 
charitable contributions . As a result, individuals or groups that do 
not favor the subsidy may effectively pay a lower tax share to fund 
the subsidy because they can use their unimpaired political capital to 
get other government benefits. 
This possibility suggests another way to model the question of 
optimal subsidy structure.  The tax cost to  individuals who benefit 
from the 1 7 0( c )  good will not be neglected, and together they will 
bear the entire increase in taxes needed to fund the subsidy. Thia 
captures the idea that the political process might shift the costs of 
government programs onto those who benefit from them . There will be 
no unidentified third parties who will absorb part of the tax revenue 
coat without a fuss. 
Some of the parties who benefit from the 170 (c )  good may be 
non-contributors .  These individuals shoUld be taxed in a Lindahl 
equilibrium . My model handles this by splitting the low-income class 
into two parts . A proportion P of that class contribute ,  and the rest 
experience the same benefits as the contributors but make no 
contributions. The contributors all contribute the same amount . 
Since non-contributors and contributors experience the same benefits, 
in a Lindahl equilibrium, the tax increase for non-contributors must 
be larger than that of the contributors by the amount of the 
contribution. It is assumed that this tax reaUlt within the low­
income class is achieved by logrolling or some other political 
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device . 25
The next issue is  how to  model the diStribution of  tax 
revenues between the high-income class and the low-income class.  My 
model leaves this question partially open. The tax rate increase for 
each high-income individual is taken to be 1 + & as large as the tax
rate increase for each contributing low-income individual , If & = O, 
then both taxpayers' rates increase by the same amount . This is an 
increase that is neither progressive nor regressive; in this model it 
is the analog of the "across-the-board differential in marginal tax 
rates" that Hochman and Rodgers consider to be a reasonable 
assumption. 26 If & is greater than O, then the rate increases used to
fund the subsidy are progressive with respect to contributors in the 
sense that the contributor with greater income must pay a greater 
added percentage of his or her income. 
It is plausible to use positive values of &. Establishing or
deciding to continue the charitable contribution deduction is an 
easier decision � � � that there will be a later overall
decision on tax rates. Separating the decision on tax rates means 
that legislators can focus on the effect of income tax rates both on 
incentives to work and on the distribution of income without 
considering devices such as the charitable contribution deduction for 
funding public goods . Given the small number of high-income 
individuals and the egalitarian sentiments in American society, it is 
not at all unreasonable to anticipate & > O when additional revenues
must be raised through the tax system and when raising revenue is the 
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sole focus of legislators .  
Using the equations derived i n  the Appendix, I calculate a 
subsidy rate for high-income individuals that is consistent with a 
Lindahl equilibrium if low-income individuals are not subsidized at 
all.  This corresponds to a situation where low-income individuals are 
not subsidized because the subsidy is an itemized deduction and each 
low-income individual's total itemized deductions are less than the 
zero bracket amount . In the numerical simulations presented in this 
subsection each high-income individual has six times the income of a 
low-income individual and there are three times as many low-income 
individuals as high-income individuals. 27
The subsidy rates that emerge depend on four more parameters .  
One is the tax share parameter 6 that has already been discussed.  The
second is the proportion P of low-income individuals who contribute . 
The third is a, the "income elasticity" of charitable contributions. 
This parameter determines how such contributions increase with 
increases in income. The two values that are used are . 7 5  and 1 . 0 .  
These values are at the lower and upper ends of the empirical 
estimates in the literature.  The value . 7 5  means that for each one 
percent increase in income charitable contributions increase three­
quarters of one percent. The value 1 .0 means that charitable 
contributions increase by the same percentage as income does. 
Finally, a fourth parameter indicating the responsiveness of giving to 
a subsidy is set for all individuals at the value estimated "for all 
income classes" in the empirical literature.  In  other words , the 
possibility that high-income taxpayers might be more responsive to 
subsidies for giving is ignored even though , as the next subsection 
demonstrates,  this possibility may increase the attractiveness of a 
deduction versus a flat subsidy . 
The following two tables report the subsidy rates for high-
income individuals required under a Lindahl equilibrium when low-
income individuals are not subsidized . If we assume that the high-
21 
income individuals face the current highest marginal rate of .so,  then 
an itemized deduction under current law consists of a .so subsidy for 
high-income individuals and a zero subsidy for low-income individuals 
who presumably do not itemize. Thus , if the numbers in the tables are 
large (around .so or greater ) ,  then the disparities in subsidy rates 
caused by an itemized deduction do not appear to be unreasonable on 
the basis of Lindahl criteria. 
Table 1 
Lindahl Subsidy Rate for High-income Individuals 
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The first entry in the first table , . 44 ,  is the subsidy rate 
that must be provided to high-income individuals under the Lindahl 
criteria if low-income individuals are not subsidized, if & = .1 and
if the income elasticity is . 7 S ,  a figure in the lower range of the 
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available econometric estimates. The value of . 1  for & indicates that
the tax increases used to fund the subsidy are not very progressive: 
high-income individuals experience a tax rate increase only 1°' larger 
than the increase for individuals with one-sixth the income. 
The tables indicate that when the tax increases used to fund a 
subsidy for charitable contributions are even slightly progressive, 
the high-income individual should be heavily subsidized when the low­
income individual is not subsidized at all.  The size of  the numbers 
suggests that the disparities in subsidy rates inherent in a deduction 
may not be unreasonable on the basis of Lindahl criteria .2 8
Furthermore, comparing the two tables indicates that a higher subsidy 
rate for high-income individuals is required when a smaller proportion 
of low-income individuals contribute. This makes sense , In place of 
contributions, the non-contributors pay taxes used to induce more 
contributions from high-income individuals via a higher subsidy 
23 
rate . 29
3 ,  � Additional Arguments for � Deduction as gn 
Appropriate Subsidy 
Hochman and Rodgers' central argument for a flat-rate subsidy 
such as a tax credit is the one discussed above : they believe that 
that type of subsidy is more likely to approximate a Lindahl 
equilibrium than a deduction. They also discuss two other potential 
justifications for use of a deduction. First , they consider and 
reject as unlikely the possibility that giving by high-income groups 
involves greater positive externalitites than giving by others. A 
second possible justification for a deduction is that high-income 
individuals have a larger price elasticity for contributions so that 
subsidizing them more would increase activities that low-income and 
middle-income individuals favor at a lower cost to those individuals . 
Hochman and Rodgers dismiss this possibility by noting that the 
evidence for a strong positive correlation between the absolute value 
of the price elasticity for contributions and income is weak and that , 
in any event, providing a greater subsidy to high-income individuals 
will shift the composition of giving in the direction that that group 
favors. 30
Hochman 4 Rodgers may have been too quick to  dismiss the
second potential justification. Although the evidence (some of which 
postdates their article ) is not conclusive, the possibility that the 
absolute value of the price elasticity of giving increases 
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31 significantly with income must be taken quite seriously . If such an 
effect exists and if low-income taxpayers want the same 170( c )  goods 
that high-income taxpayers support by contributions, then low-income 
taxpayers would be better off paying higher taxes to subsidize the 
contributions of high-income taxpayers than to subsidize the 
contributions of their own income class. This possibility is enhanced 
by the fact that there is strong ( but not conclusive) evidence that 
for high-income taxpayers the revenue loss from subsidizing 
contributions is more than made up for by the induced increase in 
contributions. The same cannot be said about subsidies for the 
contributions of other taxpayers. 3 2
Furthermore, it i s  not clear how much significance there i s  in 
the fact that providing high-income individuals with a high subsidy 
shifts giving in the direction of organizations traditionally favored 
by that group ' s  contributions . Those organizations ( including 
primarily educational institutions and hospitals)  may provide 
significant benefits for individuals in other income classes. In 
addition, the optimal subsidy rate is probably not the same for all 
activities, and some activities are supported by government benefits 
other than subsidized contributions . It would not be surprising, for 
example , if contributions to religious organizations are currently 
adequate despite the fact that contributors to religion generally are 
subsidized at a lower rate based on having less income, Exploring 
that possibility would be a difficult empirical task, 33
c. The Functioning of the Political Process
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The previous section discusses several ways in which the 
charitable contribution deduction might be an unobjectionable 
political bargain. The discussion is fairly simple and involves some 
drastic assumptions. Nonetheless, there is an important conclusion 
that follows from the discussion: the deduction ' s  higher subsidy rate 
for high-income individuals may be just a way of insuring both 
economic efficiency and an allocative mechanism that accords with the 
preferences of all voters including lower-income and middle-income 
people who are not the apparent or immediate beneficiaries of the 
deduction. This possibility raises an important issue: does the 
political process function in such a way that the charitable 
contribution deduction plausibly is an efficient and distributionally 
neutral device that results in an outcome like Lindahl equilibrium? 
This section shows that the two extreme views on this issue 
are hard to swallow given current knowledge , Under one view the 
political process produces a result close to Lindahl equilibrium or a 
related concept. Under the opposite view, the political process 
systematically ignores the preferences and welfare of low-income and 
middle-income groups . The deduction is largely a boon for high-income 
individuals financed by other people ' s  tax payments. The other 
people , who comprise a rather substantial majority , do not have 
sufficient political power or political awareness to correct the 
situation. 
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Pessimism about the first , "positive" view comes from many 
sources. First , over the past two decades economists have attempted 
to design theoretical mechanisms to attain the proper level of public 
good production and the proper allocation of costs. There appear to 
be no mechanisms without theoretical problems, 3 4  Furthermore, 
experiments using various mechanisms do not provide reason to be 
optimistic. Sane of the mechanisms seem to result in close to the 
optimal quantity of public good but with an inappropriate distribution 
of costs. Other mechanisms fail to come near the optimal overall 
quantity. 3 5 
If economists have failed to produce good allocation 
mechanisms that stand up theoretically or experimentally, it seems 
unlikely that actual political processes will do any better . In fact , 
existing knowledge about these processes suggests greater pessimism . 
Theoretical studies of majority rule and representative democracy 
reveal that such systems have deep problems. For example, a well­
known result for majority rule is that unless voter preferences 
display certain patterns the voting process may ttcycle" over various 
alternatives . "Cycling" over three alternatives A, B and C occurs if 
A is chosen over B,  B is chosen over C ,  but C is chosen over A . !nl': 
of the three alternatives may be chosen in a series of pairwise 
eliminations depending on which alternatives are run against each 
other first . This result is a simple example of the outcome depending 
solely on the "agenda . "  The existing literature reveals many other 
theoretical problems both with majority rule and with representative 
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democracy. 36 At the same time , empirical studies are at an early
stage , and good tests of even the most simple models of the workings 
of the political process do not exist at present . 37 Finally, there
are studies that are more "institutional . "  These studies focus on the 
impact of the interests of politicians and bureaucrats on public 
output , and the studies identify various forces that lead to too much, 
too little or the wrong kind of public output. 3 8
Given the results of all this work,  the assertion that the 
political process produces a Lindahl equilibrium or an outcome close 
to it is too bold. Such an outcome cannot even be assured 
theoretically or in a laboratory where the vagaries of real world 
processes can be avoided or ignored. In the actual political process 
a Lindahl equilibrium may be buried by agenda manipulation or may be 
distorted to serve the interests of politicians or bureaucrats. Thus , 
it is hard to accept the "positive" extreme view. 
But it is also hard to accept the "negative" extreme view that 
since passage of the charitable contribution deduction in 1 917 it has 
served the interest of high-income individuals at the expense of 
middle-income and low-income individuals. High-income groups do not 
comprise a large proportion of the total population, and it is hard to 
imagine that the other groups do not have considerable political 
power . 3 9  Furthermore,  the availability of devices such as logrolling 
suggest that it is possible to shift the costs of the deduction onto 
those who benefit from it. 40 
Despite the importance of knowing how well the political 
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process works for judging the charitable contribution deduction, it 
appears that current knowledge does not offer a definitive answer. 
There are some elements such as logrolling in the process that make it 
possible that the deduction is at least roughly an efficiency­
enhancing political bargain, But there is no assurance that a result 
as normatively pleasing as a Lindahl equilibrium emerges from the 
process. 
III. Donor Motivations and the Choice of Policy Instrument
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There are two groups that have an interest in a charitable 
enterprise: the donors who support the enterprise financially and its 
nondonor-beneficiaries. In Part II both groups are assumed to be 
satisfying their own "private consumption" demand for public goods 
they are not concerned with the tastes, happiness, or consumption of 
others . The main goal in that Part is to determine whether the 
charitable contribution deduction and accompanying legislation achieve 
a Lindahl equilibrium outcome or result from a political bargain that 
is normatively unobjectionable in the sense that middle-income and 
low-income individuals are not made worse-off, The conclusion is 
indeterminate on that point: it is possible but by no means assured 
that the deduction and accompanying legislation have those qualities. 
Despite this indeterminacy, I assume in this Part that the 
deduction and accompanying legislation provide public goods through a 
political bargain that is in the interest of many groups. The first 
section describes reasons for using the deduction rather than other 
methods of government provision to satisfy "private consumption" 
demand for public goods . The remaining sections consider the policy 
mix that would best serve as a political bargain when public good 
demand and the desire to make contributions arise from more complex 
motivations . For analytic ease each of these five sections considers 
a single type of motivation that may give rise to charitable giving : 
non-substantive motivations, desires for alternatives to government , 
utility externalities, consumption externalities, and desires to 
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influence the tastes of others. 
The discussion for each motivation is meant to be suggestive 
and speculative rather than definitive and rigorous. In addition, the 
set of motivations studied is not meant to be exhaustive . I wish to 
show that viewing the charitable contribution deduction as the result 
of a political bargain in the interest of many groups has important 
implications for setting the mix of government policies. Many of the 
implications go beyond or even contradict the conventional wisdom on 
the subject . Thus, if the political bargain view is correct, then 
important changes in and additions to the traditional approach to 
policy mix issues are in order. 
A. Instrumental Efficiency Justifications in the "Private 
Consumption" Case 
Examining the "private consumption" case allows us to address 
a basic question,  When is the charitable contribution deduction a 
more efficient instrument for providing public goods than direct 
government provision? 
Suppose , for example, that there is considerable uncertainty 
about the public ' s  preferences or that tastes fluctuate frequently. 
In that situation, the charitable contribution deduction serves a 
"preference revelation" function by allowing contributors to determine 
the mix of activities while the government retains at least some 
control over the overall quantity by setting the price of 
contributions to 170( c )  organizations. The uncertainties about what 
goods to provide may be the very reason why direct government 
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provision of the goods is not feasible. A related rationale for 
provision through a contribution-funded private sector is "pluralism 
for efficiency reasons . "  Efficient provision of the goods may require 
a diversified, internally competitive private sector unhindered by the 
bureaucratic and institutional distortions that may affect government 
provision. 
The charitable contribution deduction subsidizes contributions 
to all eligible activities at the same rate. Generally however, 
different activities will have different price elasticities and income 
elasticities for contributions, 41 different non-subsidy levels of
contributions and different optimal levels of contributions. This 
suggests that the optimal subsidy rate structure for contributions may 
vary substantially across activities. An efficiency problem will 
therefore exist with a deduction, a tax credit or any other tax 
incentive that is the same for all activities. 
Any efficiency costs of that sort, however, must be balanced 
against the low administrative costs of a tax deduction. A deduction 
is a familiar tax device that requires no new government apparatus to 
administer it . Furthermore,  use of a deduction means that the bulk of 
contributions will come from a relatively small group, high-income 
taxpayers,  and this group will experience the greatest tax incentive 
to report contributions. It may be easier to monitor such a small 
group to control practices such as claiming non-existent contributions 
or inflating the value of contributions actually made . 42 Finally,
activities that are seriously "undersubsidized" by the deduction may 
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b e  given additional government benefits t o  correct the situation. 
There also may be cases where a deduction works best as a 
complement to direct government provision. For example , it may be 
cheaper to provide the bulk of some good such as primary education by 
direct government provision but to use subsidized contributions to 
fund a variety of special kinds of primary education that the 
government cannot provide efficiently. Alternatively,  subsidized 
contributions may reveal residual demand for more of the kind of 
education that the government provides. 
The next five sections will consider situations where the mix 
of government policies is dictated by particular donor motivation 
patterns as well as by instrumental efficiency , For purposes of 
exposition, instrumental efficiency considerations will be ignored 
except to the extent that they interact with the particular 
motivations under examination. 
B. Nonsubstantive Motivations 
A donor may be motivated to give for reasons other than an 
interest in the substantive output of the donee 170 (c )  organization. 
This "nonsubstantive giving" may arise in response to pressure from 
friends , pressure from 501 ( c ) ( 3 )  solicitors, and pressure from 
employers or society generally. Alternatively ,  the donor may simply 
enjoy the act of giving itself or may derive prestige from the act of 
giving. Professor Simon has cautioned that the justification for the 
charitable contribution deduction would be considerably weakened if 
giving is "mindless, " "sentimentally" motivated, or the result of 
pressure from family, employer or 170 (c )  organizations. 43
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It is not clear, however, that nonsubstantive giving is 
socially unproductive. "Nonsubstantive donors" may be giving in 
response to what some other person or institution thinks is desirable . 
The degree to which nonsubstantive giving will be socially productive 
depends on how nonsubstantive donors choose one cause rather than 
another . At least three types of institutional or personal catalysts 
may influence such donors .  First, they may be influenced directly by 
"substantive donor s . "  This type of influence is probably positive -­
the substantive donor in effect contributes not only his or her own 
resources but also those of the nonsubstantive donor . In addition, 
substantive donors and nondonor-beneficiaries who benefit from the 
170 (0 )  activity supported by nonsubstantive donors may favor making 
those donors eligible for any contribution subsidy since the goal of 
such a subsidy is to increase support for the activity regardless of 
how the increase comes about. 
A second catalyst for giving is solicitation by 170 ( c )  
organizations. This vehicle raises the spectre of self-perpetuating 
170 ( c )  organizations surviving on tax-deductible contributions from 
nonsubstantive donors when substantive demand for the organization' s 
activities is almost zero , Leaving aside the desires of those who run 
the organization, this condition is not Pareto optimal because 
nonsubstantive donors could satisfy their desires by giving to 170 ( c )  
organizations providing goods and services for which there is 
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substantial substantive demand. Despite these concerns, in the long 
run the effectiveness of solicitation by 170 (c )  organizations probably 
rests to a large extent on social perceptions that ultimately derive 
from substantive demand for public goods . In addition, solicitation 
by 170( c )  organizations may serve valuable purposes .  Solicitation may 
inform potential contributors and nondonor political supporters about 
the value of a 170(c )  organization ' s  goods and services and thereby 
generate substantive demand for its output . 
A third catalyst is general social pressure that is not 
imposed specifically by donors or 501 ( c ) ( 3 ) s .  For example, a person 
may give to his or her alma mater out of a sense that it is proper to 
do so without specific pressure from the institution or other donors.  
Individuals themselves ultimately generate these general social 
pressures by initiating or perpetuating ideas about which institutions 
should be supported. However, these pressures may operate with a lag. 
The potential misdirection of resources while nonsubatantive donors 
adjust to new social perceptions is a potential coat that must be 
counted in evaluating certain changes in government policy . Suppose, 
for example ,  that direct government provision of a 170( c )  activity is 
added to supplement contribution subsidies. The direct government 
provision lowers the need for provision by 170( c )  organizations. But 
nonsubstantive donors may delay reducing their contributions until new 
social perceptions have time to lower the social approbation 
associated with such contributions. As a result, there may be a 
temporary oversupply of the activity in question, 
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How does subsidizing nonsubstantive donors fit into the view 
of the charitable contribution deduction as a political bargain? 
Substantive donors and nondonor-beneficiaries may have to pay 
additional taxes to fund the subsidy to nonsubstantive donors .  But if 
the nonsubstantive donors direct their contributions to 170(c )  
organizations in such a way as to raise the value of the output of 
such organizations to the substantive donors and nondonor­
beneficiaries more than the additional taxes, those groups will 
benefit from the subsidy . In addition, as long as part of the subsidy 
is funded by other parties, nonsubstantive donors will be better off. 
Although nondonor-beneficiaries and substantive donors may benefit 
from the donations of nonsubstantive donors this way, there is an 
additional issue . Suppose that nonsubstantive donors ' contribution 
patterns differ substantially from those which would result if 
nondonor-beneficiaries or substantive donors donated the same money, 
Might it then be a good idea to disallow subsidies for nonsubstantive 
donors and at the same time to increase subsidies for substantive 
donors? 
There are several answers to that question. First , it is 
probably impossible to distinguish between substantive donors and 
nonsubstantive donors.  For many donors substantive concerns blend 
with pressures from others to dictate choice among potential 170 (c )  
organization donees.  Second, even if it were possible to draw such a 
distinction, it may be desirable to continue subsidizing 
nonsubstantive donors.  Those donors may be more responsive to 
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subsidies than substantive donors.  Thus, the "bang" per tax dollar 
paid by nondonor-beneficiaries and substantive donors to fund 
contribution subsidies may be greater if nonsubstantive donors are 
subsidized instead of extending greater subsidies to substantive 
donors.  This effect may outweigh the fact that nonsubstantive donor s '  
patterns of giving are "distorted" i n  the eyes o f  substantive donors 
and nondonor-beneficiaries.  Third, if substantive donors know what 
the pattern of 17 0 ( 0 )  organization receipts are, they can redirect 
their own pattern of contributions to "correct" for the "distortion" 
caused by the contributions of nonsubstantive donors. 44
C. Desire for Alternatives to Government 
Where the donor ' s  motivation is a desire to establish 
alternative institutions that overlap or preempt government functions 
regardless of the efficiency of those institutions compared with 
government, pluralism is desired for "preference" as opposed to 
"efficiency" reasons. Preference pluralism has strong public good 
aspects -- one person' s efforts to set up a private alternative to 
government will satisfy another ' s  desire for such an alternative even 
though that other contributes nothing to its creation. 
Those who desire alternatives to government will oppose 
replacing provision by 170( 0 )  organizations with government provision. 
Viewing provision by 170( c )  organizations as a political bargain, the 
existence of this group would tend to delay the shift of 170 (c )  
activities to the public sector until the efficiency gains or other 
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possible gains from doing so  were substantial . Those who are 
interested in the activities as nondonor-beneficiaries or as 
substantive donors would face paying extra taxes to make up for losing 
part or all of the net payments of the preference pluralism group to 
the activities if such a shift were made , 
D. Utility Externalities 
Utility externalities exist when one person' s utility depends 
on another' s utility. Utility externalities present a traditional 
public good situation, Where persons A and B both desire C to be 
happier , transfers to C will benefit both A and B regardless of the 
source of the transfers,  and neither A nor B can be excluded from 
benefiting if either makes a transfer . Where utility externalities 
are implemented by donations, the donor is best off making a cash 
transfer since the recipient will use that additional income to 
maximize his or her own utility. A striking feature of the 170( c )  
sector , however , is that it almost exclusively provides specific goods 
as opposed to income transfers . 
There are many reasons to believe that 170(c )  organizations 
are extremely inefficient vehicles compared to governments for 
providing income redistribution even at the margin. Most of these 
reasons stem from the fact that an income transfer program requires 
immense administrative resources. It is vital to be able to determine 
what each individual' s income is so that transfers are directed only 
to those who are truly needy. In addition, if the redistribution 
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program covers a large region or the entire nation, millions of 
transfers will be involved and the composition of the class of 
transferees will constantly shift. On the other hand, limiting the 
program to a small area may be impossible if the benefits are at all 
significant. Significant benefits may result in migration of poor 
people to the area with consequences that include financial drain but 
also extend to straining the area' s capacity to place its poor in 
productive, well-paying j obs as a permanent solution to their plight. 
That migration would threaten to make the nation poorer by 
exacerbating inefficiency in labor markets as well as by diminishing 
the chance of self-sufficiency for some of the poor . 
Federal and state governments are uniquely placed to 
redistribute income. They have a great deal of detailed information 
about incomes that they must collect to run the tax and welfare 
systems, and they can ensure at least some degree of national or state 
uniformity in transfers . It is no surprise that governments have 
little competition from 1 7 0( c )  organizations even for residual demand 
for income transfers. The sheer size of administrative economies of 
scale in redistribution programs suggests that a single supplier , 
government, will most likely provide almost all redistribution. 45  
E. Consumption Externalities 
If person A is concerned not with person B' s happiness as 
evaluated by person B but with what particular mixture of goods B 
consumes, then there is a "consumption externality" as opposed to a 
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"utility externality" between the two of them. When there is a 
positive utility externality between groups, !..� . •  members of group A 
are happier if people in group B feel happier , then there is a basis 
for legislation setting up transfers between group A and group B since 
both groups can be made better off by such transfers if the utility 
externality is strong enough .46 But the case of a consumption
externality offers much less scope for smooth political interactions. 
Suppose group A prefers that an individual B consumes more of good X 
and less of all other goods . Group A will be satisfied by legislation 
that lowers B's income and utility so long as consumption of good X is
increased .  In fact, group A will want t o  shift B's consumption by 
means that minimize the transfer of resources from group A to B.  For 
example , group A might desire legislation that taxes B' s consumption 
of goods other than X and reduces B' s income taxes by the amount of
the revenue from the tax on the goods. This should result in 
consumption by B of more x. 47 At the same time, ignoring 
administrative expenses ,  there is no cost to anyone else since the tax 
and refund scheme has no net revenue consequences.  
There may be several situations in which a contribution 
subsidy like the charitable contribution deduction might emerge as a 
political bargain to implement consumption externalities. Consider 
first use of a contribution subsidy as an exclusive way to implement 
consumption externalities .  If the A s  are limited t o  "donative" 
instruments (such as subsidies , direct grants of good X ,  and "rewards"
for consuming more X than a fixed quantity) to shift the consumption
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of the Bs, then the Bs cannot be made worse-off by the As' actions . 
Gifts and positive incentives can always be refused.  So  limiting As 
to donative instruments is valuable to Bs who otherwise face the 
prospect of the use of sticks such as taxation or government sanctions 
that may make them worse-off,  The Bs therefore might favor allowing 
As to implement their consumption externality tastes through the 
170 ( c )  sector and the charitable contribution deduction. The Bs might 
even pay part of the tax cost of the deduction as applied to these 
activities in order to steer the As away from using other more direct 
government devices .  
There i s  one problem with using direct provision o f  goods to 
satisfy consumption externalities. If the recipient already buys some 
of the good , normally the recipient will not increase the total amount 
of good consumed by the amount provided directly for free.  Instead 
the recipient will cut back on his or her market purchases of the good 
and use the extra money to buy other goods . This suggests a possible 
synergy between government and the 170( c )  sector with respect to 
consumption externalities. The government might provide large 
quantities of a good X for free to a particular group while taxing the
group an amount equal to the total cost of the good so provided. 
Given this "base" level of provision, additional direct provision 
might be effective in increasing consumption of X .  Contribution­
funded 17 0 ( c )  organizations could then satisfy residual consumption 
externality demand. 
This possibility of valuable coordination of government and 
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170(c )  activity suggests the central role of interactions between the 
two. Where the government and the 170 (c )  sector provide the same 
goods or close substitutes and donors are aware of the government 
programs, the size and scope of the 170( c )  sector depends on donor 
expectations about government activity. If the government is expected 
to maintain a particular policy such as a given user subsidy or level 
of provision regardless of 170( c )  activity, then added donor 
contributions will help implement consumption externalities . But it 
may be the case that additional 170(c )  activity will result in a 
reduction in government activity, and at the extreme it may result in 
a one-for-one reduction. In such a situation additional giving will 
be diminished or e!iminated. The synergistic use of 170 (c )  
organizations to sop up  residual consumption externality demand given 
a base of government provision will only succeed if the government 
does not exploit additional giving by changing its provision leve1 . 48
F .  Desire to Influence the Tastes of Others 
In some situations group A wants to change the tastes of 
another group, B.  For example, an environmental group might want 
people to be more conscious of the environment or the old might want 
the young to adopt certain political beliefs.  Taste-changing desired 
by groups is a public good. If a member of group A spends to change 
the tastes of group B, all the members of A benefit from whatever 
changes occur . 
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At first glance there appears to be no particular reason to 
distinguish activities aimed at changing tastes from other activities 
that satisfy public . good demand . There is , however, at least one 
important practical difference between taste-changing and other public 
goods . 49 Successful taste-changing measures may result in policy
choices with irreversible consequences .  Suppose a country goes t o  war 
after certain groups in the country engage in a massive campaign to 
stir up pro-war sentiment . There may be no low-cost method of getting 
out of the war even if the effects of the taste-changing campaign wear 
off and the political basis for going to war evaporates . 
The case for the existing restrictions on political activity 
by 17 0 (c )  organizations may be partially justified by the political 
dangers of large short-run fluctuations in tastes. The main 
restrictions are on overt activity aimed directly at the political 
process: grassroots lobbying is restricted and support of political 
candidates is banned.so These activities have public good aspects,
but such restrictions lessen the danger of a "preemptive" strike by 
pockets of wealth through a massive campaign to change tastes . 
Subsidies are aimed at activities that work toward taste-changing more 
indirectly and slowly by providing information and research . Use of 
these activities to change tastes allows opponents a fairer 
opportunity to strike back and allows people time to reflect before 
agreeing to new leadership or new legislation that may irreversibly 
affect the course of events . Present restrictions , therefore, allow 
some forms of taste-changing to be subsidized but at the same time 
discourage taste-changing that short circuits the gradualism of 
politics. This position is likely to command wide support, and 
therefore it is not surprising that the position has emerged as 
legislative policy from the current political process. 
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There is at least one subtle way in which the current system 
of contribution funding may satisfy demand for taste-changing as a 
public good. This involves overt and covert donor influence on 170( c )  
organizations that provide educational services. Educational 
institutions probably play a significant role in molding the future 
attitudes and beliefs of students. Donors may attempt to control this 
belief-shaping process by explicitly tying their contributions to the 
adoption of particular curricular approaches. Educational 
institutions may hesitate to teach doctrines that are unpopular with 
actual or potential donors. 51 
The potential problem with a deduction as a form of 
contribution subsidy in this instance is similar to the potential 
problems in other instances. A deduction encourages the contributions 
of high-income individuals more than the contributions of other 
individuals so that it increases high-income group "donor influence" 
over educational institutions disproportionately, If the high-income 
group wants to instill beliefs that are not supported by other income 
groups , the public good aspect satisfied by the deduction does not 
extend to those other income groups who may even see encouragement of 
such beliefs as a "public bad . "  
There are a range of "political bargain" responses if this 
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situation of conflict between groups occurs, First , the non-high­
inccme groups may demand compensation in the form of lower taxes or 
higher expenditures on their behalf, This will effectively shift the 
tax revenue cost of the deduction to the high-income group. Second, 
groups other than the high-income group can shift the funding of 
education more towards direct subsidies for students or other forms of 
direct government support that are alternatives to donor subsidies. 
Such a move might reduce the efficiency-motivated pluralism in 
education because of the greater government role, but it would also 
dilute the influence of high-income donors over educational 
institutions. 52 In any event, this is another instance where the role 
of the charitable contribution deduction in the overall government 
policy mix may depend critically on the existing pattern of individual 
motivations. 
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IV . Conclusions 
Much of the literature on the charitable contribution deduction 
focuses on the concern that the deduction unduly favors high-income 
taxpayers. The method of approaching that concern often includes an 
attempt to directly assess the fairness of the deduction in terms of its 
costs and benefits for various groups . This article suggests that both the 
concern and that way of approaching it may be misguided .  I n  particular, 
the article shows that the deduction and the legislation accompanying 
it may be a political bargain that benefits all groups including 
low-income and middle-income groups . This possibility suggests that 
in assessing the deduction it is important to focus on the functioning 
of the Political process . If that process allows low-income and 
middle-income individuals to protect their interests,  it seems 
unlikely that they are harmed by the deduction. 
This article also shows that if the deduction is part of a 
Political bargain that benefits a wide r ange of groups , then the 
appropriate role of the deduction in conjunction with other government 
policies depends heavily on the particular motivations of donors and of 
nondonors who benefit from or are harmed by the activities that the donors 
support .  For example,  i n  the case of education, student subsidies may be 
an attractive alternative to a deduction for contributions to educational 
organizations if low-income and middle-income individuals are opposed to the 
added overt or covert influence of high-income contributors on curriculum 
that is a by-product of the deduction. 
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misjudgments are my own responsibility. 
1 .  
2 .  
This concern has dominated much of the literature concerning the 
charitable contribution deduction. See, �.g. ,  Andrews , Personal 
Deductions in .rui. Ideal Income �. 86 HARV .  L .  REV. 3 09 ( 1 972)  at
310-1 2 ,  314-15 ( higher subsidy to high-income taxpayers makes 
charitable contribution deduction indefensible as tax expenditure 
but tax theory arguments may justify it as way of measuring 
income) ;  Simon, Charity � Dynasty Under the Federal Tax System, 
THE PROBATE LAWYER , Summer 1 97 8  at 20-24 (dismissing Andrews ' tax 
theory argument and finding high subsidy to high-income taxpayers 
"a prima faoie violation of progressivity") . 
Traditionally, the deduction has been an itemized deduction, but 
this is changing . For 1 982 and 1983 only 25% of the first $100 
in charitable contributions may be taken "above the line" as a 
non-itemized deduction. In 1 984 this limit is raised to 25' of 
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the first $300 in contributions . In 1 985 half of all charitable 
3 .  
contributions can be taken as "above the line" deductions, and in 
1 986 all charitable contributions can be so deducted , But after 
1 986 the law reverts to its pre-1982 state where the charitable 
deduction is available only as an itemized deduction. See , 
I . R . C , II 170 ( i ) .
The following table for 1 980 is based on data in INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME -- 1980 ,  INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 
RETURNS ( 1982 ) : 
Adjusted 
Gross Income 
( thousands of $ ) 
< 5 
5 - 1 0  
10 - 1 5  
15  - 2 0  
> 2 0  
all classes 
Percentage in Class 
Versus All Returns 
2 1 . 3 �  
1 9 . 56, 
1 5 .23, 
11 . 82, 
3 2 . 03, 
100.00I 
Percentage of Itemized 
Returns In Class 
2 .27, 
7 . 3 °'  
17 . 99' 
3 2 . 36, 
6 9 .  79' 
3 0 . 83, 
4 .  This recent work includes Hochman and Rodgers , The Optimal Tax 
Treatment of Charitable Contributions , 3 0  NATIONAL TAX J .  1 
( 1 97 7 )  and Simon, supra note 1 .  Those two articles receive 
extensive attention in the rest of this article.  
5 ,  See Simon, supra note 1 ,  at 6 6 .  
6 .  See id . at 6 2 .  
7 .  See id,  a t  82 , 84 . 
8 ,  See id. at 84 . 
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9 .  This approach gives heavy weight to the concern about favoritism . 
The preferences and beliefs of the favored group are ignored, and 
everyone else must be satisfied that the favoritism is 
acceptable.  
There is one significant way in which the norm might not 
fully capture concerns in the literature.  Some high-income 
individuals may believe that the deduction and accompanying 
legislation do not provide enough benefits for low-income and 
middle-income individuals even though these individuals are 
satisfied with the distributional consequences in light of the 
benefits they receive. The norm gives no weight to this type of 
preference on the part of high-income individuals .  Nonetheless,  
this article considers the role that this type of preference may 
play in a political bargain producing the deduction and 
accompanying legislation. See TAN 44-48 infra. 
1 0 .  For a good summary o f  the work t o  date o n  the price elasticity 
for charitable contributions � Clotfelter � Steuerle,  
Charitable Contributions, in H. AARON � J, PECHMAN , eds . , HCM 
TAXES AFFECT ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 403 ( 1 981 ) and the associated 
comments .  
11 . For example ,  volumes III and IV of Research Papers sponsored by 
the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs ( U . S .  
Dept . o f  Treasury, 1 977)  contain over 3 0  papers o n  the effects of 
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the tax system on the amount and composition of 17 0 ( c )  
activities. Many of these papers focus primarily on the 
charitable contribution deduction. For a discussion of the 
massive amount of empirical work on the incentive effects of the 
deduction see Clotfelter � Steuerle , supra note 1 0 ,  
1 2 ,  Clotfelter � Steuerle after comprehensively reviewing all the 
empirical work in the area and presenting their own findings note 
that the exact econometric specification used has a big impact on 
the findings so that "caution should be used in making policy 
prescriptions on the basis of such findings . "  See Clotfel ter � 
Steuerle ,  supra note 1 0 ,  at 437 . Some of the problems with the 
findings may result in systematic bias . For example,  there is 
the possibility that taxpayers in high brackets tend to overstate 
their contributions so that empirical studies using tax return 
data would find such taxpayers more repsonsive to the deduction 
than they actually a.re . See id. at 424 n . 3 8  and id , at 446 
( comments by John A.  Brittain) . 
13 , Some of the nonprofit organizations that are eligible to receive 
deductible contributions under II 17 0 ( c )  may "correct" market
failures other than public good problems.  See Hansmann, The Role 
of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L , J .  83 5 ,  843-73 ( 1980)
( discussing various corrective roles ) .  Nonetheless, the public 
good rationale for a subsidy applies to many if not to 
substantially all of the organizations. 
1 4 .  See Hochman � Rodgers , supra note 4 .  
1 5 .  See id , at 8 .  
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16 , This situation can occur because taxes in a Lindahl equilibrium 
cannot result in a redistribution of consumer surplus. Each 
person is taxed at a rate per unit that reflects only his or her 
valuation of the last unit of output . The fact that the person 
may value earlier units more highly than the last unit has no tax 
consequences . It is easy to construct examples where Lindahl 
equilibria exist only at zero public good production but some 
positive level of public good provision is a Pareto improvement 
over no provision if the consumer surplus from production of the 
public good is redistributed . 
17 . At first glance it is not implausible to assume that people 
ignore the distributional effects of consumer surplus. Concern 
about the distribution of consumer surplus either for private 
goods or public goods is rarely voiced at the individual or 
societal level . This may be the result of a general feeling that 
each individual ' s  consumer surplus depends on his or her capacity 
to enjoy and that having a higher capacity to enjoy should not 
trigger distributional concern. On the other hand , silence about 
the distribution of consumer surplus may reflect the difficulties 
inherent in ascertaining that surplus for each individual or even 
for broad classes of individuals .  I t  makes little sense to talk 
about redistributing consumer surplus if it cannot be observed. 
1 8 ,  See Hochman 6 Rodgers,  supra note 4 ,  at 9-10 and note 26 .
Sl 
19 .  This showing requires an  assumption that the income elasticity of 
marginal valuation is independent of the quantity of public good 
produced .  This point i s  discussed i n  the Appendix infra at note 
A2 ,  
20. Hochman 6 Rodgers, supra note 4 ,  at 10.
21 . This intuitive explanation is worked out more rigorously in the 
Appendix . See TAN AS and note AS infra. The Appendix also shows 
that under current empirical beliefs about charitable giving a 
flat-rate tax credit would require regressive tax rate changes to 
be a Lindahl equilibrium . See TAN A6 infra. 
22. A second justification that Hochman 6 Rodgers use is that the
changes in tax rates would be small since "charitable giving is
less than two percent of personal income, "  Hochman 6 Rodgers ,
supra note 4 ,  at 9 .  Presumably, this i s  meant to suggest that
such changes are so small that they will be ignored by the
individuals concerned. This argument ignores the political 
visibility of the deduction. Each taxpayer may be unaware of 
exactly how much he or she pays to fund the deduction each year,
but information about the deduction itself is readily available
to taxpayers and their political representatives. The 1 983 tax
expenditure budget estimates the revenue loss from the deduction 
at over 1 0  billion dollars for fiscal 1 983 , See The Budget of 
S2 
the United States Government , Fiscal Year 1 983 , Special Analysis 
G, "Tax Expenditures" (February 1 982 ) ( Table G-2 ) . It is hard to 
imagine that political representatives are unaware that someone 
must pay for this revenue loss through higher taxes ( or through 
increased deficits,  reduced expenditures or some other device 
that is modelled as a tax increase in this article and in Hochman 
d Rogers ' article ) ,
23 . Hochman 6 Rogders, supra note 4 ,  at 9-1 0 ,
24.  Hochman 6 Rodgers are aware of this probl em ,  They note that
under Lindahl equilbrium an individual who makes no contribution 
and places no value on the final unit of public good produced 
should pay no extra taxes to fund a subsidy for contributions. 
See id. at 17 n.26 . They then point out that in their model the 
valuation of the final unit of public good production increases 
positively with income. If rates are increased by the same 
percentage for each person, the tax payments required to fund the 
revenue loss from the deduction will also increase with income. 
See id . Presumably, the idea is that there is not much deviation 
from a Lindahl equilibrium . Aside from the vagueness of this 
reasoning, it depends on including the tax part of each 
individual ' s  payment in the analysis . This article does that in 
a rigorous way, and the result is that Hochman d Rodgers '
conclusions become doubtful . 
2 S .  This i s  a much stronger assumption than the one that will follow 
53 
for the relation between tax increases for high-income 
contributors versus low-income contributor s .  This assumption is 
necessary , however, if there is to be a Lindahl equilibrium where 
a given income class has both contributors and non-contributors 
who benefit equally from the 170 ( c )  output . The alternatives are 
to abandon the Lindahl equilibrium norm or to leave the 
nondonor-beneficiaries out of the formal model as Hochman and 
Rodgers do . 
The reader who is troubled by the strength of the 
political assumption here can always consider the case P = 1 ( set 
out separately below) where all beneficiaries are contributors. 
That case has some theoretical appeal : if demand for the 170( c )  
good i s  considered t o  be strictly a function o f  income, i t  makes 
sense to model contribution behavior that way too. An additional 
interesting point is that the results for the case P = 1 
correspond to at least one Lindahl equilibrium where all members 
of the low-income class are taxed the same amount . That is true 
when the contribution of low-income individuals who do contribute 
is the amount of extra value that those individuals place on the 
170 ( c )  good at the margin compared to low-income non­
contributors . Thia is a special case but may be a good 
approximation : those who contribute may do so because they value 
the 1 7 0( 0 )  good more. In any event, the goal here is not to 
prove that the charitable deduction is a Lindahl equilibrium but 
to show that under a political bargain view it is at least as 
plausible a candidate as a flat-rate tax credi t .  
26 . It is only strictly the analog in the case where all the low­
income individuals are contributors or where contributing low­
income individuals are modelled to have higher marginal 
valuations of the 17 0 ( c )  good than non-contributors by exactly 
the amount of the contributions. Otherwise , when & = O, low­
income non-contributors will suffer a higher tax rate increase 
than high-income individuals and low-income contributors .  
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27 . The Appendix shows that these exact numbers are not critical to 
the results.  Reducing the income gap tends to make the results 
less like a deduction. But even if the gap is reduced from six 
times to two times, the results are roughly the same. Changes in 
size of the low-income class relative to the high-income class 
also have little effect . See TAN A4-A5 infra. 
2 8 .  Of course, these results do not � that a deduction provides a
good approximation to the optimal subsidy rates under Lindahl 
criteria . The model is much too simple to have the strength of a 
proof . But the results indicate that the possibility that a 
deduction approximates the Lindahl requirements must be taken 
seriously. 
2 9 .  I n  Table 2 when & = . s  and the income elasticity i s  0 . 7 5 ,  no
positive subsidy rate for the high-income taxpayer less than one 
will suffice for a Lindahl equilibrium to exist . This is 
SS  
indicated by the entry ">1"  rather than an  actual number because 
subsidy rates greater than one are inconsistent with the 
empirical assumptions about the responsiveness of giving to a 
subsidy used in the calculations . A subsidy greater than one 
means that the taxpayer gets more back from the government than 
he or she contributes . A rational taxpayer would then give all 
of his or her wealth plus whatever he or she could borrow. 
3 0 ,  See id . at 1 3 .  
It is well known that high-income individuals tend t o  give 
more to educational organizations and hospitals while low-income 
individuals tend to give more to religion. See Clotfelter 6 
Salamon, The � of the 1981 Tax Act on Individual Charitable 
Giving, 3 5  NATIONAL TAX J .  171 , 179 ( 1982 ) ; Clotfelter 6 
Steuerle,  supra note 10 ,  at 421 , 
31 , See Clotfelter 6 Steuerle,  � note 1 0 ,  at 426-31 ,
3 2 .  The general conclusion of the econometric work is that the price 
elasticity is significantly less than zero, but only for the 
highest income brackets is it fairly certain that the elasticity 
is less than minus one .  See id. The additional induced 
contributions will exceed the tax revenues lost if and only if 
the elasticity is less than minus one . 
33 . Religious organizations receive the lion ' s  share ( around 6�) of 
all individual charitable contributions. See Clotfelter 6 
Salamon, supra note 3 0 ,  at 1 81 ( Table 5 ) . But this does not 
resolve the real issue : whether subsidies expand contributions 
sufficiently so that religion is provided at an optimal level . 
Furthermore,  determining the optimal subsidy level for 
contributions is complicated by the fact that religion receives 
other benefits from government . 
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34.  Many of the mechanisms aim at inducing individuals to reveal 
their demand for public goods . The mechanisms that succeed at 
doing this succeed only under limited assumptions , and generally 
speaking systematic cheating by coalitions can undermine the 
revelation properties of such mechanisms. For an elementary 
discussion, � A. ATKINSON 6 J ,  STIGLITZ , LECTURES ON PUBLIC
ECONOMICS 51 3-15 ( 1980 ) ; R .  TRESCH, PUBLIC FINANCE :  A NORMATIVE 
THEORY 119-21 ( 1981 ) . 
3 5 .  For a discussion o f  various experimental results see Smith, An 
Experimental Comparison of Three Public Good Decision Mechanisms , 
81 SCAND. J, ECON . 1 98 ( 197 9) . 
36 .  For an  elementary and short discussion that includes a more 
detailed analysis of "cycling, "  see A. ATKINSON 6 J .  STIGLITZ ,
supra note 3 4 ,  at 2 99-310.  Good comprehensive surveys are A. 
SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE ( 197 0) ; Mueller, Public 
Choice : A Suryey, 1 4  J. ECON . LIT. 3 95 ( 1 976 ) ; Plott,  Axiomatic 
Social Choice Theory: An Overview and Interpretation, 20 AM. J.
POLITICAL SCIENCE 511 ( 1 976 ) , 
37 . See A, ATKINSON 4 J ,  STIGLITZ , supra note 3 4 ,  at 3 22-26 . 
3 8 ,  See, �.g, , !.!!. at 310-1 5 ,  328 ( analyzing impact of bureaucratic 
interests ) ;  M. FIORINA, CONGRESS : KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON 
E.STABLISHMENT ( 1977 )  ( arguing that governments tend to 
overprovide services due to the interests of politicians) ,  
39 .  A fact that supports this assertion is that traditionally the 
charitable contribution deduction has been available only to 
those who itemize their deductions but the vast majority of 
taxpayers do not itemize. See note 3 supra ( 3 0 . �  itemize in 
1 980 ) ; Clotfelter 4 Salamon, supra note 30 ,  at 1 80 ( 70J> do not 
itemize as of 1981 ) ;  Simon, supra note 1 ,  at 82 ( 75'JI do not 
itemize as of 1 97 8) , 
40 ,  See TAN 24 supra. 
Logrolling is no panacea, however , It does not eliminate 
"cycling, " it can lead to overprovision of goods by the 
government , and it is subject to strategic manipulation. For a 
good general discussion, see Mueller , supra note 3 6 ,  at 406-407 . 
41 . See Clotfelter 4 Steuerle,  supra note 1 0 ,  at 41 9-22 .
42 . High-income individuals already are audited much more frequently 
than low-income individuals ,  See COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL 
REVENUE AND THE CHIEF COUNSEL FOR THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 
ANNUAL REPORT ( 1 982 ) at 44 ( in 1 981 government audited 7 , 83� of 
returns of i ndividuals with total positive income over �50 , 000
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versus 1 . 77� o f  all returns of individuals) , 
43 . See Simon, supra note 1 ,  at 90-91 , Professor Simon is not alone 
in his concern. For example,  considerable scholarly and 
Congressional attention has been devoted to the fear that the 
allocation of contribution dollars among health charities hinges 
much more on the success of competing public relations campaigns 
than on the substantive role of each charity . See Brannon 4 
Strnad, Alternative Approaches to Encouraging Philanthropic 
Actiyities, IV Research Papers Sponsored by the Commission on 
Private Philanthropy and Public Needs 2361 , 237 4-77 ( 1 97 7 ) . 
44 .  The only problem with this third answer is that nonsubstantive 
donors may have so favored certain 170 ( c )  organizations that the 
organizations are funded at or above the optimal level even if 
contributions from substantive donors have fallen to zero in an 
attempt to correct this situation. 
4 5 .  For a related discussion, see Brannon 4 Strnad, supra note 43 , at 
237 8-7 9 ,  See also Roberts , A Positive Model of Private Charity 
and Public Transfers, 92 J, POLIT. ECON . 136 ( 1 984) (assuming 
private organizations are less efficient than government at 
providing public goods , political equilibrium model predicts zero 
direct aid to poor by private charity) , 
46 . See Hochman 4 Rodgers, Pareto Optimal Redistribution, 59 AM. 
ECON . REV. 542 ( 196 9) ; Polinsky , Shortsightedness � Nonmarginal 
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Pareto Optimal Redistribution, 61 AM. ECON . REV. 972 ( 1 971) .
47 . Using an income tax reduction to return the revenues from the tax 
on the goods essentially eliminates any "income effect . "  
Individual B faces a lower price for good X and higher prices for 
all other goods . The result should be larger purchases of X and 
lower purchases of other goods . 
4 8 .  For further discussion o f  "crowding out" effects and their 
implications for policy , .!!.fil!. Abrams 6 Schitz , The "Crowding-Out" 
Effect of Governmental Transfers on Private Charitable 
Contributions, 33 PUBLIC CHOICE 29 ( 1 97 8 ) ; Roberts , supra note 
4 5 ;  Rose-Ackerman, Do Government Grants to Charity Reduce Private 
Donations, in M. WHITE, ed. , NONPROFIT FIRMS IN A THREE SECTOR 
ECONOMY 95 (Urban Institute,  COUPE #6 , 1 981 ) ;  Steinberg, 
Voluntary Donations and Public Expenditures, Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute and State University Working Paper E84-07-01 ( July 
1 984 ) ;  Weiss, Donations : Can They Reduce � Donor ' s  Welfare? , in 
Susan Rose-Ackerman, ed. , THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR : ECONOMIC THEORY 
AND PUBLIC POLICY, forthcoming, 1 985 , 
49 .  At the theoretical level , there is also at least one important 
difference . It may be hard to apply a Pareto optimality norm 
when the public good at issue is taste-changing . See ,  �.g. ,  
Marschak, .Qn the Study of Taste Changing Policies, 6 8  AM. ECON .
REV. 3 86 ( 1 978) ; Weisbrod, Comparing Utility Functions in 
Efficiency Terms, or What Kind of Utility Functions Do We Want ? ,  
6 0  
67 AM. ECON . REV. 991 ( 1 977 ) . 
S O .  See I . R , C . 88 17 0 ( c ) ( 2 ) (D ) ,  S01 ( c ) ( 3 )  and SOl ( h )  ( denying tax­
exempt status and ability to receive deductible contributions if 
organization attempts to influence legislation or participate in 
or intervene in any political campaign as a substantial part of 
organization' s  activities ) .  
51 . Overt and covert influences on educational institutions that 
arise from contribution funding are documented and discussed in 
Brannon 6 Strnad, � note 43 , at 2368-72 .
52 . For a discussion of the pros and cons of direct subsidies for 
students as an alternative to contribution-funding of educational 
institutions, see Brannon 4 Strnad, supra note 43 , at 2373 . 
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Appendix 
This Appendix formalizes Hochman � Rodgers ' model and presents 
the alternative model that is the basis for the critique in the text 
of their conclusions. Suppose there is a single , contribution-funded 
170 ( c )  activity that produces a quantity Q of a public good. Consider 
two people, A and B, who are interested in the public good , Suppose 
that person A has income YA, pays additional income taxes to fund
subsidies for contributions to the activity through an increase in 
rates by t ' (YA) ,  voluntarily contributes CA toward purchase of the
good, and is subsidized by the proportion SA of contributions. When Q 
of the public good is produced , suppose person A values the last unit 
provided at MEA(Q) , If an optimal amount Q
• 
of the public good is 
provided , then for Lindahl equilibrium to obtain the following 
relation must hold : 
( 1 )  
This relation states that for A the price of the good, the sum of 
total net contributions and extra taxes paid divided by quantity, is 
equal to his or her marginal valuation of it . For person B there is a 
similar Lindahl condition: 
( 2 )  
Hochman � Rodgers assume that A has a n  income that i s  higher 
than B ' s  by the factor ( 1  + X) and that contributions are strictly a 
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function of income when there is no subsidy : 
YA = ( 1  + X)YB ( 3 )  
CA = ( 1  + aX) CB when SA = SB = 0
where a is the income elasticity of charitable contributions . This 
income elasticity is assumed to be independent of income . Although 
( 4 )  
this model with constant income elasticity i s  fairly simpl e ,  it does 
roughly reflect a reality where there is a positive income elasticity 
for giving. Al Using the assumption that the income elasticity of
marginal valuation is equal to the income elasticity of charitable 
contributions, A2 the following equality must hol d :  
MEA = ( 1  + aX)MEB
so that 
CA( l  - SA) + t ' (YA) YA = 
( 1  + aX) [CB( l  - SB) + 
t ' (YB)YB] ,
Hochman � Rodgers assume that the tax terms in equation ( 6) 
can be neglected so that it simplifies to:  
Now if SA = SB and A and B have the same price elasticity for 
charitable contributions, then CA = ( 1  + aX) CB and equation ( 7 )  is
satisfied since differences between A ' s  and B ' s  gross contributions 
( S )  
( 6 )  
( 7 )  
arise solely from the fact that they have different incomes . This is 
the mathematical basis for Hochman � Rodgers ' conclusion quoted in the 
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text that "a flat-rate tax credit is likely to provide a good 
approximation to the Lindahl requirements . "  
The text argues that Hochman � Rodgers ' assumption about the 
tax terms is not a particularly reasonable one . In the rest of this 
Appendix I construct a model that specifies the subsidy structure 
corresponding to a Lindahl equilibrium for any given pattern of tax 
increases that fund the revenue loss from the deduction. My model 
begins with the Hochman and Rodgers framework set up so far, but adds 
three important features : 
( 1 )  the tax terms in equation ( 6 )  are not neglected; 
( 2) the model includes a constraint requiring that the tax 
increases fund the revenue loss from the deduction; 
( 3 )  a third class of persons is added who benefit from the 170( c )  
good but make no contributions . 
For convenience , I assume that this third class of persons have 
incomes equal to YB and that their demand for the 170 ( 0 )  good is the
same as others with that income. Suppose that the tax rate increases 
for this third group are t ' ' ( YB) YB . It follows that in Lindahl 
equilibrium 
I . e . , since contributors and non-contributors value the 170(0)  good 
the same at the margin, their total payments must be equal . 
The model now consists of two income groups with the low-
income group divided between contributors and non-contributors. 
( 8 ) 
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Suppose that the low-income group has N times as many people as the 
high-income group and that the proportion P of the low-income group 
are contributors. If we set SB = o and choose N appropriately large ,
we have a rough approximation to the historically typical situation 
where a large number of non-itemizers receive no subsidy while a class 
of itemizers consisting primarily of high-income taxpayers do receive 
a subsidy . 
Now reconsider equation ( 6 ) . YA is ( 1  + A) as large as YB .
Assume that the tax rate increase t ' (YA) for taxpayer A is ( 1  + 6 )
times the tax rate increase t ' (YB) for taxpayer B .  The parameter 6 is
a measure of the progressivity of the income tax increases that will 
fund the deduction. Now assume that with no deduction B would make CB 
in contributions and that � is the absolute value of the price
elasticity of charitable contributions for both A and B .  Because the 
income elasticity of giving is a ,  
( 9)  
Using equation ( 9) , expressing all tax rate and income variables in 
terms of t ' (YB)YB and dividing through by ( 1  + aA) , ( 6 )  becomes :
( 10) 
In order for tax increases to exactly cover the revenue loss 
of a deduction, it must be true that 
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( 11 )  
Here ( 1  - P)CB + t ' (YB)YB is the average tax share of people with
income YB. The proportion ( 1  - P) do not contribute and thus pay 
CB + t ' (YB )YB in taxes while the rest pay t ' (YB) YB .
Using ( 9) ,  equation ( 11 )  yields an expression for t ' (YB)YB :
CB[ ( l + SA� ) ( l  + aA) SA - N ( l  - P) ]t ' (YB)YB = [N + ( 1  + & ) ( 1  + A) ]  
Define the parameter y as 
y (1 + & ) ( 1  + A) - ( 1  + aA) ( 1  + aA) [N + (1 + & ) ( 1  + A) ] •
Substituting for t ' (YB) YB in ( 10) using (12 )  and rearranging we
obtain :  
[y ( l  + aA) - l ] �s! + [ y ( l  + aA) + � - l ] SA
- y ( l  + aA) N ( l  - P)  O.  
( 12 )  
( 13 )  
( 14 )  
The tables in the text are generated using equation ( 14) to  
compute SA for various values of  & and P .  In  those computations N is
set at 3 ,  � at l .2 S ,  A at S ,  and . 7 S  and 1 are alternative assumptions 
for a .  The values for a are i n  the lower and upper range o f  the 
values found in the econometric literature while the value for � is 
close to the price elasticities found in studies that pool all income 
groups together . A3
When a real solution exists , equation ( 14 )  generally produces 
two solutions for SA. In all the simulations in this paper ,
a � 1 ,  & ' O, and A ' O. When those inequalities hold,  one of the
solutions for SA will be negative. This solution is rejected on the
ground that the goal is to stimulate charitable donations and a 
subsidy structure with SA < O and SB = O will reduce them .
A4 
The tables in the text take N = 3 and A = 5 .  The result 
reported in the text is that a high subsidy rate for high-income 
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taxpayers generally is required to meet the Lindahl conditions . Table 
3 indicates that this result is not very sensitive to the choice of N 
and A. This table is calculated for the case & = . 1 ,  a = 1 and A =  2 
( except for the "Text" column which reports the values for the set of 
parameters used in the text tables :  & = . 1 ,  a =  1 ,  A =  5 and N = 3 ) . 
The case & = . 1  and a = 1 results in the lowest subsidy rate for 
high-income taxpayers among the values & = ( . 1 ,  .25 , . S )  and 
a =  ( . 7 S ,  1 ) .  Furthermore ,  when A is reduced , the optimal subsidy 
rate falls. As a result ,  Table 3 represents a situation where we have 
chosen values of & ,  a ,  and A that minimize the required SA but are
still plausible.  
Table 4 
Required SA for & . 1 ,  a = 1 and A = 2
( Text column : & = . 1 ,  a = 1 ,  A s .  and N 3 )  
N = 1 N = 3 N = 4 N = 1 0  Text 
p = 0 .42 . 49 . Sl . S6 . S S  
p = . 1  
. 41 . 48 . 49 . S3 . S 4  
p = . 2 5  . 3 9  . 4 5  . 46 . so . so 
p 
=
 . s  . 3 6  . 4 0  . 41 . 44 .4S  
p 
=
 1 . 2 8  . 2S . 24 . 22 . 27 
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The intuition behind the result that a high SA is required
when SB 0 is apparent from equation ( 10) . For & > O and values of a
less than one , as the tax variable t ' (YB)YB increases in order to fund
a subsidy for giving, the left-hand side of ( 10) increases more 
quickly than the right-hand side. This reflects a "progressive" tax 
increase falling heavily on A.  The result is that A ' s  net payment 
becomes too large relative to B ' s  net payment . In order to reduce A ' s  
net payment , the first term in equation ( 10) , a term proportional to 
A ' s  net charitable contributions, must fal l .  A s  SA i s  increased from
O, this term initially rises. When SA becomes large enough (greater
than . 10 for � = 1 .2 5 ) , A5 the increase in the subsidy effect of the
(1 - SA) term outweighs A ' s  tendency to increase gross contributions.
As a result A ' s  net contribution falls. As SA tends toward 1, the net
contribution tends toward o. Thus , in order to offset the
"progressive" nature of the tax increase,  SA may have to be set quite 
high in order to decrease A ' s  net charitable contribution 
sufficiently.  
Another issue is  what tax shares would be required if a flat-
rate subsidy of the sort Hochman � Rodgers advocate is desired. 
Consider persons A and B who are both contributors.  When SA = SB ( 7 )
implies CA = ( 1  + a).. ) CB and using that result in ( 6 )  implies that
( 15 )  
( 1  + & ) ( 1  + ).. ) t ' (YB) YB s o  that
6 8  
1 + a).. & = � - 1 . ( 16 )  
This implies that & must be negative i f  the income elasticity for 
charitable contributions is less than one as appears likely from the 
empirical literature. A6 If & is negative, a greater increase in tax 
rate must be imposed on the contributing low-income taxpayer than on 
the taxpayer with higher income. Furthermore, equation ( 8) indicates 
that low-income taxpayers who do not contribute must suffer an even 





Empirical studies consistently have found that the income 
elasticity for contributions is positive. See Clotfelter 4 
Steuerle, supra note 1 0 ,  at 41 0-11 , 420-21 , 425 and 428 .  
6 9  
Moreover , those studies suggest that that income elasticity may 
not be constant with income, See id . at 410-11 and 42 8 .  This 
is not a problem for the model here since a can be interpreted 
as the average income elasticity for incomes between YB and
( 1  + A.)YB '
Hochman 4 Rodgers "prove" this assumption. See Hochman 4 
Rodgers, supra note 4 ,  at 16 n . 2 2 .  Since the goal is to measure 
• • 
the difference between MEA ( Q  ) and MEB ( Q  ) ,  the evaluation is 
• 
done with Q fixed. If Ni is the total net payment ( including
additional taxes)  for person i ,  then Lindahl equilibrium 
• • 
requires Ni = MEi ( Q  ) Q  Thus , where Yi is i ' s  income,
• 
oNi/oYi = Q oMEi/&Yi and it follows that the income elasticity
of Ni is equal to the income elasticity of MEi .
This same analysis can be carried out for c0 instead of Q
•
where Q0 is the level of output when no subsidy for charitable
contributions is provided . In that case Ni = Ci where Ci is i ' s
contribution with no subsidy, But then the income elasticity of 
Ni is just a .  Assuming that the income elasticity o f  marginal 
evaluation is independent of Q, a is also the income elasticity 
• 
of marginal evaluation at Q • I make that assumption, so that a 
is used as the income elasticity of marginal evaluation at Q
•
. 
Use of the assumption considerably simplifies the algebra 
without substantially changing the results. 
A3 . See Clotfelter 4 Steuerle ,  supra note 1 0 ,  at 410-11 , 425 and
428.  
A4 . A more complete model would specify an optimal quantity of 
contributions and require that the subsidy structure ( SA , SB)
produce that quantity. For simplicity , the optimal quantity 
aspect of the Lindahl equilibrium calculation is ignored here.  
70 
But in an earlier version of this paper I show that in a target 
quantity model a deduction-like result (a high SA and a low ,  but 
not necessarily O ,  SB ) can easily emerge as a Lindahl
equilibrium . 
AS . More formally , the first derivative of A ' s  net charitable 
A6. 
contribution with respect to SA has the same sign as
(1 - 2SA) �  - 1 .  The derivative is zero when SA = (�  - 1 ) /2� .
For increases in SA above that level , A ' s  net charitable
contribution falls. 
Almost all of the recent estimates of the income elasticity of 
charitable contributions find values less than one , and in most 
cases the value is significantly less than one (at the 95� 
confidence level ) .  See Clotfelter 4 Steuerle ,  supra note 1 0 ,  at 
410-11 , 425 and 428 .  
